Several studies present descriptive evidence on the evolution of specialization indicators over periods of declining trade barriers. 1 This evidence mostly concerns developed countries. However, to our knowledge, there is no direct robust econometric evidence on the effect of trade policy on the overall degree of developing countries' specialization.. This paper aims at filling this gap in the literature. Specialization is worth being studied because it affects the level of welfare, the speed of economic growth, and the degree of macroeconomic convergence across economies. 2 We focus on ten Latin American countries members of the LAIA (Latin American Integration Association) over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . These countries are natural case studies because in the last two decades they implemented broad and comprehensive trade liberalization programs starting from relatively high tariff protection levels. More specifically, these countries pursued unilateral plans and also engaged in regional integration initiatives. Thus, this set of nations provides a constellation of trade reforms, which is rich enough to assess their repercussions. Second, some of these economies exhibit substantial changes in their specialization degrees over the aforementioned period. On average, production specialization seems to be increasing and manufacturing structures seems to be becoming increasingly different. We can therefore analyze to what extent general and preferential trade liberalization have contributed to shape the evolving specialization patterns in the region.
We estimate measures of overall specialization from sectoral value added to describe the countries' specialization level, both absolute and relative, and we also compute average MFN (Most Favored Nation) and preferential tariffs, which allow us to explicitly characterize the countries' trade policies. Our econometric results suggest that reducing own MFN tariffs is associated with increasing production specialization. Furthermore, we find that preferential trade liberalization and differences in the degree of unilateral openness have resulted in increased dissimilarities in manufacturing production structures across countries. These results are robust to the specialization measure being used, the correction for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, serial correlation and endogeneity biases, and the inclusion of indicators to account for the real exchange misalignment prevailing in the region during the period under examination.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset.
Section 3 derives the estimation equation and addresses relevant econometric issues. Section 4 outlines some basic stylized facts about the trade policy reforms introduced in Latin
American countries since the mid-1980s. Section 5 reports some descriptive evidence on the patterns of manufacturing production specialization and their evolution over the sample period and reports our main findings. Section 6 concludes.
Data
Our sample includes ten members of the LAIA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 3 We use annual sectoral value added at the 3-digit level of the ISIC, Revision 2, to characterize overall manufacturing production specialization in these countries over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . These data come from the database PADI prepared by the United Nation's
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and International
Industrial Statistics made available by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Table A1 in the Appendix identifies the specific data sources and time coverage, whereas Table A2 lists the sectors.
Average MFN tariffs have been calculated for each country in the sample over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . In addition, bilateral preferential tariffs have been computed for each economy over the same lapse. We have therefore data on the average tariff barriers set and faced by countries, both on a MFN basis and under bilateral and multilateral regional trade arrangements. In particular, we can distinguish between general trade liberalization and average bilateral preferential trade liberalization in the context of specific blocs such as the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. Table A3 reports country and period coverage of tariff data.
We use GDP per capita as a proxy for both relative endowments and level of development. Data on this variable are expressed at market prices in constant 1995 U.S.
dollars and come from the on line socioeconomic database BADEINSO prepared by the UN's ECLAC. We also incorporate the real effective exchange rate for imports, which is an index (1995=100) calculated by the UN's ECLAC and available from its on line macroeconomic database. Finally, we include a measure of real exchange rate misalignment taken from Terra and Valladares (2003) . They estimate misalignments as departures from the long run equilibrium exchange rate as obtained following the methodology proposed by Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) , i.e., estimating a long run relationship between the real exchange rate and economic fundamentals using cointegration techniques. Table A4 in the Appendix presents additional detailed information on these variables.
Empirical Specification and Econometric Strategy

Empirical Specification
To define the estimation equation and thus the appropriate functional forms as well as the relevant variables to be included, we will follow Harrigan (1997) and Redding (2002) . The idea is to derive theory-consistent summary measures of specialization from the standard international trade theory.
Assume a set of small countries, each of them endowed with a fixed amount of factor of productions. These factors are used to produce final goods under constant returns to scale and perfect competition conditions such that the value of output is maximized. This value is given by:
where r() is the revenue function, p is the vector of final goods prices, v is the vector of production factors, c={1,…,C} indexes countries and t time. As long as the revenue function is twice continuously differentiable, the vector of the economy's profit-maximizing net output is given by: 4
We will further assume Hicks-neutral technology differences across countries, industries, and time, so that the production function takes the following form:
where cjt θ parametrizes technology in industry j of country c at time t. As shown in Dixit and Norman (1980) , in this case, the revenue function is given by:
where ct θ is an nxn diagonal matrix of the technology parameters cjt θ . This formulation implies that industry-specific neutral technological changes have the same effect on revenue as industry-specific price changes.
Following Woodland (1982) , Kohli (1991) , and Harrigan (1997) Differentiating the natural logarithm of the revenue function with respect to each p j , we obtain the share of industry j in country c's GDP at time t, s cjt :
translog specification implies that the coefficients on the variables are constant across countries and over time.
We are interested in the economies' overall degree of manufacturing specialization.
Specialization can be defined as the narrowness of the range of activities developed in a country. Thus, a country is highly specialized if a few industries account for large shares of its overall industrial activity. To measure a country's overall degree of absolute specialization we use the Herfindahl index. Formally:
where n 1 is the number of manufacturing sectors and 1 n cjt s is the share of industry j in country c's total manufacturing value added at time t. This index ranges between 1/n 1 , when all sectors account for the same share of total economic activity, and 1, when the whole activity is accounted by only one sector. In particular, the more unequal the sectoral shares, the more specialized an economy.
Noting that We follow Redding (2002) in assuming non-traded goods prices and technology differences as being drawn from an estimable probability function. Further, we use MFN tariffs to capture cross-country differences in relative prices of traded goods as well as preferential tariffs as additional control (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004) . Moreover, we proxy cross-country differences in relative endowments using GDP per capita (see Helpman, 1987, and Romalis, 2004 Dornbusch et al., 1977, and Romalis, 2004) . We expect then the estimated coefficient on MFN to be significantly negative, i.e., higher tariffs lead to sectoral diversification in production and vice versa. On the other hand, regional trade integration leads economies to specialize according to their regional comparative advantage (see Venables, 2003) . This would also imply a reduction in the range of goods produced at home.
A priori, conditional on the degree of external openness, this might further increase specialization, i.e., stronger concentration of manufacturing activity in fewer sectors.
Furthermore, a negative estimated coefficient on GDP per capita is also expected.
This can be explained in terms of preference or portfolio arguments. In the presence of nonhomothetic preferences, changing consumption patterns towards greater diversity prevails as income growth, which induces matching changes in the structure of production when trade costs are very high (see Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003) . The second reason relates to the fact that, because of indivisibilities, sectoral diversification opportunities improve with the aggregate capital stock and the level of development (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997) .
The Herfindahl index is a common measure of sectoral concentration in the international trade and economic geography literatures (see, e.g., Sapir, 1996 , Haaland et al., 1999 . This is however only one measure among many different ones and, a priori, there is no reason to favor one over the other. Therefore, to check the robustness of our results, we follow Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) in using also the Gini coefficient based on sector shares.
This coefficient, like the previous indicator, increases with higher inequality in sectoral shares (see Cowell, 2002) .
As a result of the trade policy reforms implemented in the region, countries may not only become more or less absolutely specialized but also more or less similar to each other.
This corresponds to the notion of relative specialization. In particular, a country is relatively specialized if its economic structure differs from that of some reference benchmark, such as the region as whole or the remaining countries that belong to the relevant economic space, jointly or individually considered. Here we will focus on bilateral relative specialization, i.e.,
to what extent the sectoral composition of manufacturing value added differs across pairs of countries. To compare countries' economic structures we use the Krugman index (see Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000) . Formally:
This index ranges between 0 if both countries have an identical industrial structure and takes a maximum of 1 if they have no industries in common. Hence, the more unequal the countries' sectoral shares, the greater the relative specialization.
Taking into account that
and substituting for the countryspecific sectoral shares in Equation (13), we obtain:
where we assume that if considered factors are equal across countries, then their production structures differ by a constant summarizing any other influences. Taking natural logarithms on both sides of Equation (14), expanding in a first-order Taylor series around
[1…1]', and making similar assumptions as before, we derive the following estimation equation:
where we use differences in MFN tariffs and the average bilateral (preferential) tariffs to measure differences in relative prices and differences in GDP per capita to account for differences in relative endowments. The country-pair effects cd µ control for any permanent country-pair specific differences in trade barriers (e.g., bilateral distances) and/or any permanent differences in technology (e.g., originated in distinct institutional settings), while the time fixed effects t ψ capture common changes across countries in relative prices, technology, and factor endowments.
Given that Latin American countries have comparative advantage in a relatively homogenous subset of industries with respect to the rest of the world, our hypothesis is that the sign of the estimated coefficient on the first term (i.e., bilateral differences in MFN tariffs) will be positive, i.e., larger differences in MFN tariffs and thus in the nominal average protection conceded to domestic production will result in increased divergence of industrial structures. On the other hand, the impact of bilateral tariff barriers on the degree of sectoral dissimilarity of manufacturing production will be negative, i.e., for given extra-zone trade impediments, bilateral (preferential) trade liberalization will induce inter-industry specialization so that countries' economic structure will tend to be more dissimilar. Under the relative tariff structure associated with a preferential trade arrangement, some commodities that were originally domestically produced become to be imported from those partners that, even with a comparative disadvantage relative to the rest of the world, have a regional comparative advantage, so that sectoral composition of countries' production may be expected to diverge. We are of course aware that opening may favor intra-industry specialization (see Frankel and Rose, 1998) . However, as discussed in Venables (2003), we believe that the first case is more likely among developing countries like the ones we are considering here. Finally, we expect the difference in the relative endowments and levels of development (i.e., differences in GDPPC) to be positive.
Econometric Issues
In estimating Equations (12) and (15), there are several econometric issues that must be addressed. First, our raw dependent variables, the absolute specialization index H and the relative specialization index K, can only adopt values within [0,1] so that they are truncated.
As a consequence, classical estimation will lead to biased estimates. Their natural logarithms range in ) 0 , (−∞ and thus only partially solve the problem. We therefore perform a logistic transformation, similar to Balassa and Noland (1989) , to check whether this makes a difference. These variables become then
. Since we do not observe significant differences between those results obtained using the natural logarithms of the specialization indicators and those found using their logistic transformations, we will only report the former ones.
In addition, the standard error component model assumes that the regression disturbances are homoscedastic with the same variance across time and across individuals. This is undoubtedly a very restrictive assumption. Given the panel nature of the data, one can presume that there may be a specific pattern of disturbances associated to the presence of groups of observations. Thus, cross-sectional units may be size-asymmetric and as a result may have different variations (see Baltagi, 1995) . Furthermore, the basic model assumes that the error terms are not correlated across individuals. However, economies are not only tied to specific factors, they are also tied to common macroeconomic factors affecting the region as a whole (see Greene, 1997) and likely with differential repercussions across groups of nations. Hence, it seems likely that disturbances could be correlated across countries.
Finally, the classical LSDV model assumes that the only correlation over time is due to the presence of the same individual across the panel. In particular, the equicorrelation coefficient is the same no matter how far periods are in time. Clearly, this is also a restrictive assumption for the economic relationships under consideration, as an unobserved shock in the current period might affect the specialization patterns for at least some coming periods (see Baltagi, 1995) . Ignoring groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross sectional correlation and/or serial correlation when they are present results in consistent but inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients and biased standard errors. Therefore, we have performed relevant test statistics for identifying such data features.
The modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity in residuals suggests that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity across panels should be rejected. In addition, the Breusch-Pagan LM test indicates that the null hypothesis of independence of error across panels should be also rejected. Finally, the Baltagi-Li LM test for first order serial correlation in a fixed effects model points out that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation should be rejected, too. Hence, an estimation strategy that corrects these non-spherical disturbances is required. We remove autocorrelation from the data using the Prais-Winsten transformation and, since the number of cross sectional units is similar to the number of time periods, we then apply LS but replacing LS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors accounting for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels as indicated in Beck and Katz (1996) . Furthermore, estimating Equations (12) and (15) without controlling for relevant additional time-varying factors, may result in biased estimates (see Greene, 1997) . First, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) have uncovered a non-monotonic pattern of sectoral concentration of economic activity across the development path. More specifically, higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with lower degrees of absolute specialization up to a certain point and increased specialization thereafter. According to Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) , this relationship might emerge as a result of different forces prevailing along the development process: forces pushing for diversification, namely, non-homothetic preferences on the consumption side and portfolio arguments on the investment side, and forces favoring specialization, namely, declining trade barriers as in the Ricardian model and spatial concentration of economic activities with increasing returns to scale as highlighted by new economic geography models (see, e.g., Fujita et al., 1999, and Baldwin et al., 2003) . We therefore include a squared GDP per capita term to account for this non-linear relationship in Equation (12) to avoid a likely omitted variable bias. We expect the estimated coefficients on GDPPC and GDPPC squared to be negative and positive, respectively.
Another possible source of omitted variable biases are the episodes of real exchange rate misalignment and, in particular, real appreciation that have been observed in Latin America as countries implemented macroeconomic stabilization programs during the sample period (see Edwards, 1994) . In order to control for the influence of those phenomena on the real economy, we add an index of effective exchange rate for imports or a measure of the level of real exchange rate misalignment to Equation (12). A low and particularly an overvalued real exchange rate (i.e., below the equilibrium level) favors imports over domestic production and thus may induce a concentration of economic activity in sectors in which the country has significant comparative advantage, i.e., greater production specialization. We are also aware that this effect may be stronger, the lower the trade barriers. An interaction between the average MFN tariffs and the real exchange rate variables will be therefore also considered. On the other hand, a low/overvalued real exchange rate may facilitate the imports of required inputs (capital goods) by firms in a broader set of sectors that might become internationally competitive producers and thus may foster sectoral diversification. 7 The impact of real exchange rate on absolute production specialization is then an empirical question. We also control for the effect of the exchange rate behavior when examining relative specialization. In particular, we introduce the absolute difference of the aforementioned measures of real exchange rate in Equation (15).
These are expected to have a positive impact on the degree of difference of countries' manufacturing structures.
Finally, some endogeneity problems may be involved. Tariffs, both MFN and preferential, may endogenous. Thus, protectionism could be expected to be fiercer in larger, more diversified economies, since trade liberalization would affect many sectors and larger shares of population. On the other hand, smaller, less diversified economies have traditionally received special treatment in Latin America. These countries have conceded smaller tariff preferences to larger neighbors at least for certain periods. In addition, GDPPC as well as the real exchange rate variables may be endogenous. In particular, we can think of a simultaneity bias. Endogenous growth models highlight that an economy's pattern of international specialization and its rate of economic growth are jointly and endogenously determined (see, e.g., Redding, 1999) . The same is also true for the real exchange rate and countries' specialization patterns (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) . Moreover, highly specialized countries are more prone to suffer from idiosyncratic business cycles and thus from higher expected exchange rate variability and larger average misalignments.
In order to check the robustness of our results we have therefore carried out GMM estimations and performed the Sargan and Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions. In particular, two main dynamic panel estimators can be considered: those proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) ("Differenced GMM") and Blundell and Bond (1998) ("System GMM"). It is well known that for short panels with a large number of cross sectional units highly persistent series lead to severe finite sample bias in the first case, because the lagged levels are weak instruments of the differences. This is not the case for our econometric analysis of absolute manufacturing specialization. The number of time periods (14 years) is larger than the number of panels (10 countries) and, even though there is evidence of persistence, this not strong enough to be a cause of concern. 8 We will therefore only report 7 Rebelo and Vegh (1995) maintain that exchange rate-based stabilizations have tended to be associated with real exchange rate appreciations and sharp deterioration of external accounts reflecting a large increase of durables and capital goods imports. 8 The estimated rho parameter is around 0.400. The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable according to the bias-corrected LSDV estimator developed by Kiviet (1995) is around 0.600. Further, we find that estimates based on the method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . In contrast, the data used to perform estimations on relative specialization requires a more careful investigation, as the number of cross-sectional units, i.e., country pairs (45), is significantly larger than the number of years (14). Further, the number of observations is relatively large (around 500), which allows using a richer set of instruments. Hence, we will also present results obtained according to the method developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) .
Trade Policy Reforms in Latin America
During more than 40 years most Latin American countries maintained high tariff barriers with the rest of the world to support a strategy of import-substituting industrialization.
Since Thus, tariffs within the region have been lower than MFN tariffs and have been reduced even more dramatically. The average preferential tariff faced by countries being analyzed this coefficient is almost identical when estimating pure autoregressive models using both the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundel and Bond (1998) intra-zone tariffs within these blocs ranged between 2% and 3%. countries. In addition, petroleum refineries account for large shares of total manufacturing activity in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The Impact of Trade Policy Reforms on Manufacturing Specialization Patterns
Trade Policy Reforms and Absolute Manufacturing Production Specialization
Specialization seems to follow an upward trend in most countries. In fact, regressing the Herfindahl Index on a time trend, we find that six out of ten countries experienced significant increases in their overall levels of production specialization: Brazil, Colombia (from 1987 onwards), Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 9 This essentially reflects developments in the countries' larger manufacturing sectors. For example, in Ecuador the combined share of the two largest industries, food products and petroleum refineries, grew 9 We have tested for non-stationarity to determine whether there are concrete reasons to be concerned about this issue. In particular, we have performed the Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin et al., 2002) for panel unit roots on the specialization variable for alternative balanced panels. In doing this, we have introduced one lag of this variable to allow for serial correlation in the errors. The null hypothesis of unit root is strongly rejected for all considered configurations, regardless whether we include a time trend or not. The remaining of this subsection aims at answering this question through a formal econometric analysis. Table 1 and the former were initially smaller, then changes in the distribution of economic activity over sectors will not necessarily lead to a significant increase in the specialization level.
10 Estimation results with tariff variables lagged one period to account for the possibility that their impact on specialization patterns follow with a lag are essentially the same.These results are available from the authors upon request. 11 Figure 3 shows that levels of specialization and their evolution over time differ across economies. To exclude the possibility that these findings are driven by specific country experiences, we drop one country at a time from the sample and re-estimate Equation (12). Regression results basically coincide with those shown in Table 1 thus confirming the main messages. We also explore whether estimates are sensitive to changes in the sample period, by successively considering periods beginning in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 . Again, results are essentially the same. These results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.
Then, depending on the initial industrial structure, the impact on overall specialization might be weaker in this case.
Previous estimations control for country specific factors that remain constants over time as well as common changes across countries. However, according to economic theory, there are important additional time-varying country-specific factors that may affect the degree of industrial specialization and thus the relation under examination. One of these factors is relative endowment as proxied by the GDP per capita. Results including these variables are presented in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 . As expected, the estimated coefficient on GDPPC is negative and significant, while that on the squared GDPPC is positive and significant across the different specifications. Hence, there is non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between sectoral concentration of manufacturing value added and the level of per capital income, i.e., first sectoral diversification occurs, but there is a level of per capital income beyond which countries start to specialize again. This coincides with findings reported in Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) .
Another important time-varying factor whose omission may lead to biases estimates is the real exchange rate. Estimates obtained when incorporating this variable are shown in Table 2 . Without considering potential nonlinearities, the real effective exchange rate for imports seems to be positively related to the overall level of specialization (Column 1).
However, when its interplay with trade policy is accounted for, the estimated coefficient on this exchange rate variable is negative and significant, whereas that on the interaction term is positive and significant (Column 2). Thus, we observe that the higher MFN tariffs and real exchange rate, the greater the absolute manufacturing specialization. In the case of real exchange rate misalignment, the same sign pattern prevail, but estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero (Column 4). Henceforth, there is some evidence suggesting that a high exchange rate induces manufacturing production diversification when trade barriers are low, but promote industrial specialization when coupled with high tariff barriers.
We check the robustness of our results to the specialization measure being used and the econometric strategy. We first replicate previous regressions using the logarithm of the Gini coefficient calculated on sectoral manufacturing value added instead of the Herfindahl index as dependent variable. Estimations are reported in Tables 3 and 4 and they confirm most of our previous findings. Table 5 presents results obtained performing GMM estimations using the procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . These estimations aim at addressing possible endogeneity problems in the regressions discusses above. Our main conclusion still holds. Unilateral trade liberalization, i.e., reducing own MFN tariffs with respect to the rest of the world is associated with more concentrated manufacturing production structures. Estimated coefficients on remaining variables are similar to those reported in Table 2 , except the one on the interaction between real exchange rate misalignment and tariffs, which now becomes significantly positive thus providing additional evidence of non-monotonicities in the impact of exchange rate on overall absolute specialization. 12
This sub-section has revealed that trade policy reforms in Latin America have had a substantial impact on countries' international specialization patterns. In particular, unilateral opening has favored increasing manufacturing production specialization. Trade liberalization initiatives may also influence relative specialization across country pairs. More specifically, the magnitude of the differences in the extent to which nations liberalize their trade flows with the rest of the world as well as the level of bilateral (preferential) trade barriers may affect how similar is the sectoral composition of manufacturing production across country pairs. The following sub-section assesses this possibility.
Trade Policy Reforms and Manufacturing Production Structures: Convergence or
Divergence?
We measure relative manufacturing specialization with the Krugman index. This index quantifies the degree of bilateral sectoral disparity of industrial structures. Figure 4 presents the Krugman index for each country pair in our sample over the period 1985-1998. According to a simple regression of this index on a time trend, 22 out of 45 country pairs became more dissimilar in terms of their manufacturing structures and 7 out of 45 do not exhibit significant changes. 13 Interestingly, half of the 16 cases of reductions involve Bolivia, which moved towards convergence in terms of sectoral distribution of economic activity after starting as the most dissimilar nation for each of its Latin American partners. 14 Table 6 presents Prais-Winsten estimations with panel corrected standard errors of Equation (14). Two main results outstand. As expected, larger differences in the degree of unilateral openness with respect to the rest of the world and deeper bilateral (preferential) trade liberalization foster a higher degree of relative specialization, i.e., more dissimilar industrial structures. This is consistently true from the basic specification also when the level of development and variable reflecting the level of real exchange rate are introduced. In this sense, we should mention that larger differences in the real effective exchange rate for imports are associated with larger disparities in the sectoral distribution of manufacturing production. Table 7 shows that the core findings are confirmed after implementing GMM procedures to correct endogeneity biases: the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator and the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator. Two considerations deserve being made. First, while differences in the real exchange rate for imports seem to be an important factor influencing cross-country differences in manufacturing structures according to the former estimator, differences in the degree of real exchange rate misalignment is the relevant one when the latter estimator is used. Second, although both sets of estimates are consistent as suggested by the respective specification tests, these distinct results across methods recommend to perform a carefully comparison. As mentioned before, highly persistent series may generate weak instrument problems and thus serious finite sample biases when applying the Arellano and Bond estimator. This may be detected by comparing the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to those from OLS, which is upward biased, and LSDV (Within), which is downward biased (see Bond, 2002) . In our case, these coefficients are 0.854 and 0.497, respectively, for the model specification shown in Columns 2 and 5.
Estimates reported in Table 7 indicate that there is indeed evidence that the Arellano and Bond estimator is affected by finite sample bias. In contrast, the Blundel and Bond estimator produces an estimate which is well below the OLS one and well above the LSDV one thus appearing as our preferred estimation strategy.
Hence, regional trade integration seems to have spurred inter-industry specialization across countries. This has profound macroeconomic implications. If countries 14 Bolivia is one the poorest country in the region and suffered from a severe hyperinflation episode during the first part of the 1980s.
become more dissimilar in terms of their production structures and thus more sensitive to specific industry shocks, more idiosyncratic business cycles would prevail (see Kenen, 1969 , Eichengreen, 1992 , and Krugman, 1993 and, if exchange rates are used as an adjustment mechanism to dampen cyclical fluctuations, higher bilateral exchange rate variability should be expected. This, in turn, might act as channel of agglomeration of economic activities in the larger countries in the region (see Ricci, 1998) and might promote reversions in the integration process in the form of reinsertion of protectionist measures (see Eichengreen, 1993, and Fernández-Arias et al., 2002) .
Concluding Remarks
This paper has aimed at answering one main question: Did Latin American countries become more and differently specialized as a consequence of trade policy reforms? Our econometric analysis shows that the answer is yes.
Unilateral trade liberalization has resulted in increased absolute manufacturing production specialization. Weinhold and Rauch (1999) show that, at least for developing countries, this might have a positive impact, since specialization appears to be positively and significantly correlated with manufacturing productivity growth. One possible explanation for this result comes from models with endogenous growth through learningby-doing. In this framework, increased openness to international trade can lead to increased specialization, which in turn accelerates productivity growth by more fully realizing dynamic economies of scale. Of course, not only the degree, but also the nature of specialization is important (see Redding, 1999, and Bensidoun et al., 2001) . In Latin America, industrial activity has on average become increasingly concentrated in sectors using intensively natural resources endowments. What does this imply for this region? According to Perri et al. (2001) , the experience of other countries such as Australia, Canada, Sweden and Finland show that these rich endowments, when properly combined with policies stimulating the adoption of new technologies, are a proven growth recipe.
Preferential trade liberalization has favored a broadening of the disparities between countries' economic structures. This has important implications for the regional macroeconomics and the sustainability of ongoing integration processes. Inter-industry specialization and thus higher sensitivity to industry specific shocks are associated with more idiosyncratic business cycles and higher expected exchange rate variability, which in turn affect locational incentives and trade flows generating pressures for reintroducing protectionist measures.
The previous findings seem to be quite robust. They hold regardless the specialization measure being used, the inclusion of control variables such the real effective exchange rate for imports and the real exchange rate misalignment, and remain valid after using GMM procedures to correct biases originated in serial correlation and endogeneity. . 8 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 .
Figure 3
The figure shows the trend of the Herfindahl Index for each of the sample countries as obtained using the filter proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) .
Figure 4
The figure shows the trend of the Krugman Index for each of the sample country pairs as obtained using the filter proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997 14 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 .7
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. 5 .6 .7 .8 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 1985 1990 1995 2000 Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, H, is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Herfindahl Index. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. AVPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the country to Latin American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of AVPT plus one, where AVPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of the LAIA. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, H, is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Herfindahl Index. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). REERM is the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. REERMIS is the real exchange rate misalignment estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 1985-1998. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, G, is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Gini Coefficient. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, G, is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Gini Coefficient. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). REERM is the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. REERMIS is the real exchange rate misalignment estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 1985-1998. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Table  A1 in the Appendix. The dependent variable, H, is the natural logarithm of the overall level of specialization as measured by the Herfindahl Index. MFN is the natural logarithm of the average Most Favored Nation Tariff set by the country plus one. RIAPM is the average preferential margin conceded by the country within the most important RIA with Latin American partners, i.e., the natural logarithm of MFN plus one minus the natural logarithm of RIAPT plus one, where RIAPT is the average preferential tariff applied on trade flows with members of this agreement. GDPPC is the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC2: squared). REERM is the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. REERMIS is the real exchange rate misalignment estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 1985-1998. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) (2) Beck and Katz (1996) (correctection for groupwise heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation, and serial correlation). Sample size is defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. The dependent variable, K, is the natural logarithm of the relative level of specialization as measured by the Krugman Index. DIFF MFN is the absolute difference of the natural logarithms of Most Favored Nation Tariffs set by the countries plus one. AVPT is the natural logarithm of the average bilateral preferential tariff plus one. DIFF GDPPC is the absolute difference of natural logarithms of the Gross Domestic Product per capita. DIFF REERM is the absolute difference of the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. DIFF REERMIS is the absolute difference of the real exchange rate misalignments estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 1985-1998. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) Columns (1)- (3) report one-step GMM estimations according to the procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) with MFN and AVPT treated as predetermined and remaining variables as endogenous. Sample size defined as in Table A1 in the Appendix. The Sargan Test is based on two-step estimations (Arellano and Bond Estimations) . Columns (4)-(6) report onestep GMM estimations according to the procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) .
Instrumented used are 1-5 lags of DMFN and AVPT, and 3-6 lags of DGDPPC, DRERM, DRERMIS in the level equation; and 2-6 lags of DMFN and AVPT, and 4-7 lags of DGDPPC, DRERM, DRERMIS in the difference equation. Reported estimated coefficients are standardized, i.e., slopes are multiplied by the standard deviation of the respective explanatory variable and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. The dependent variable, K, is the natural logarithm of the relative level of specialization as measured by the Krugman Index (K(-1): lagged one year). DIFF MFN is the absolute difference of the natural logarithms of Most Favored Nation Tariffs set by the countries plus one. AVPT is the natural logarithm of the average bilateral preferential tariff plus one. DIFF GDPPC is the absolute difference of natural logarithms of the Gross Domestic Product per capita. DIFF REERM is the absolute difference of the real effective exchange rate for imports calculated by the ECLAC for the period 1987-2001. DIFF REERMIS is the absolute difference of the real exchange rate misalignments estimated by Terra and Valladares (2003) for the period 1985-1998. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
